in the main text for a summary of the amount of data before and after cleaning. For the CA dataset, we only include 6 datapoints where we have trial time, deliberation time in hours, final vote, and one count to deliberate on. Once cleaned, we 7 have 53 trials for CA 6, 338 trials for CA 8, and 1726 trials for CA 12 out of 6482 total trials. We do not know whether the kept 8 data suffers from selection bias after removing data that is incomplete. Data may be incomplete, for example, for trials that take 9 an especially short time or for hung juries because jurors may have less motivation to fill out long forms describing trials and 10 deliberations if the trial seems inconsequential. The qualitative similarities of datasets, however, despite the varying amount 11 of data removed, suggest that any bias should not significantly affect our results (as shown in Fig. 1 in the main text) . In the
because V p (t)/N = 1/2 is known to be unstable past a critical point in the MVM when the influence of neighbors changes from 27 weak (and opinions are evenly split) to strong (and there is near-unanimous agreement) 1, 2 . Using this numerical finding, we 28 create a similar, but much simpler, model in which the number of jurors voting for the plaintiff is represented as a node in a
29
Markov chain, and there is a bias for juries to have greater agreement (see Fig. S1 ). In the model, juries begin evenly split
30
(V p (0)/N = 1/2) but can transition to a new state, V p (1)/N ± 1/N, with probability (1 − s )/2. Once jurors reach this new state, 31 they can achieve greater consensus, V p (1)/N ± 2/N, with probability (1 − s )/2, or stay in the current state. This pattern can
32
(1-s')/2 (1-s')/2 (1-s')/2 (1-s')/2 q'
A Markov model approximation of the influence model. We assume states change as a Markov chain, therefore with probability s we remain in state V p (t)/N = 1/2, but transition to V p (t)/N = 1/2 ± 1/N with probability (1 − s )/2. Once we are at a new state, we either transition to V p (t)/N = 1/2 ± 2/N with the same probability or stay in the current state. Finally, with probability q , juries stop deliberating. continue until juries stop deliberating with probability q' at each timestep. Recall that, in the influence model seen in the main 33 text, a juror will choose not to re-evaluate their opinion with probability s, and even if they do re-evaluate, they may choose to 34 keep their original opinion, therefore it is reasonable for self-loops to exist in the Markov chain model. That said, because s is 35 often less than 1, and p > 1/2, it is reasonable to assume that opinions develop stronger pluralities over time, ergo the Markov 36 chain model captures many qualitative features of the influence model. Starting from time t = 1, we find that the probability a 37 jury is evenly split by the time they stop deliberating at time t is 38
which implies that
and the probability the jury stops deliberating with an opinion V f p /N = 1/2 ± 1/N at time t is
and the probability over all time is
Using Pr(1/2,t) and Pr(1/2 ± 1/N,t), we can also find the mean deliberation time conditioned on the final vote:
and
where . is the average. If s → 0 (in other words, V p (t)/N = 1/2 is very unstable), then we find that
In comparison
The probability that deliberation stops at V f p /N = 1/2 is small, but so is the time that this deliberation would subsequently 40 take. In comparison, V f p /N = 1/2 ± 1/N is more likely, but mean deliberation time is subsequently higher. If we continue to
41
V f p /N = 1/2 ± 2/N, T delib is expected to further increase because it takes at a minimum number of timesteps to reach the state.
42
In short, the Markov chain model helps explain why T delib is low when the jury is evenly split, even though the probability for a 
where T is the number of timesteps. Taking T to be large, using the Sterling's formula, and dropping non-leading terms,
This immediately implies that D ∼ T 1/2 . T is not, as of yet, explicitly defined because T is still the number of timesteps and 54 not an actual time. We can, however, set T ∼ T trial , and, because Table S1 details the amount of data for the OR and CA civil data split by trial time. As we describe in the beginning of the 61 SI, the trial time is recorded in days, and the conversion from trial time hours to days is 4 hours per day. 
Alternative Jury Models

63
We mention in the main text that removing all hung conditions in the herding and stubbornness model will produce a poorer fit 64 (see Fig. 4 in the main text and Fig. S2 ). To better understand why this is the case, we separately remove the dependence of the A comparison between the normalized log-likelihood of three model variants for the CA 6, CA 8, CA 12, OR 6 and OR 12 datasets: no hung conditions, in which the influence model does not change when juries hang, no hung stop, in which the rate juries hand depends on the current vote but not whether the jury is hung, and finally no hung stubbornness, in which the stubbornness rate does not depend on whether the jury is hung. In this plot, a value of −1 corresponds to the fit of the full model. Values less than −1 correspond to fits worse than the full model. quitting rate, q, and stubbornness rate, µ eff (t), on whether the jury is hung. In the former case, we see a small change in the 66 log-likelihood, but in the latter case, the log-likelihood has a more significant drop. This suggests that jurors depend more on 67 changing their stubbornness rate than changing their quitting rate when they avoid hanging. 
Oregon Criminal Cases
69
In this section, we compare data and fits for criminal and civil cases in Oregon. The reason we separate the data is both because 70 the requirements for a verdict are different (ten out of twelve jurors are need to agree instead of nine out of twelve, although 71 five out of six still need to agree in six-person juries), and the motivations for reaching a decision may be different. Overall, we 72 find quantitatively similar findings between criminal and civil cases. First, we compare OR 6 and OR 12 attributes seen in Fig.   73 2 of the main text (Fig. S3) . We find that T delib is higher for OR 6 criminal cases compared to civil cases, but the trend is not 74 as clear for the OR 12 cases (Fig. S3a) . That said, in all cases we see that T delib is higher when there is greater disagreement 75 among jurors. We also find that juries are commonly found to reach a verdict and hung juries are rare (Fig. S3b) . Finally, we 76 see that Pr(T delib ) is almost exactly the same for both civil and criminal cases.
77
Next we compare the fits for civil and criminal cases. Overall, we find that civil and criminal cases fit each model similarly 78 well (Fig. S4 ). For example, the one-mode and two-mode null models give some of the worst fits, and the two-timescale conditions has a much smaller effect. We also see the same qualitative trends when we separately remove the dependence of the 82 stubbornness rate or quitting rate on whether the jury is hung (Fig. S5) . In both the criminal and civil cases, removing the 83 stubbornness rate's dependence on whether a jury is hung creates a significantly worse fit compared to removing the quitting 84 rate's dependence. The normalized log-likelihood of the one-mode, two-mode, and two-timescale null models, along with the "no herding" model, "no stubbornness" model, "no vote dependence" model, and the "no hung conditions" model (see main text for definitions). (b) In a zoomed-in graph, the influence model variants seen in (a) perform worse than the full influence model. Overall, all models perform worse than the full model.
Correlations Between Jury Attributes
86
In this section, we discuss correlations between various attributes, in order to better understand how to model jury dynamics.
87
First, we look at how the jury size affects the deliberation time (Fig. S6) , and notice very little correlation between the two.
88
This contrasts with many models of opinion dynamics in which deliberation time strongly correlates with system size 4, 5 . Next,
89
we compare how the trial time depends on the final vote (Fig. S7) . Interestingly, although both the trial time and the final 90 vote strongly affect the deliberation time (Fig. 2 in the main text) , neither are strongly correlated with each other. We use this property to find separate mechanisms for the correlation between each attribute and deliberation time.
92
Finally, we plot the probability a typical voter will vote for the plaintiff (or vote guilty in criminal cases), Pr(Outlier For
93
Plaintiff), versus the vote of all the other jurors for OR 12 (Fig. S8 ). We find a strong correlation between the two in civil 94 cases and criminal cases, therefore juror opinions are not independent, which gives strong evidence that herding may exist in The y-axis is the probability a random juror, which we call the outlier, votes for the plaintiff, while the x-axis is the fraction of all the other jurors voting. We find that there is a correlation between jurors: the fraction of jurors voting for the plaintiff correlates with the likelihood that the removed juror also votes for the plaintiff. This is further demonstrated in the logistic regressions, y = 
